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Abstract
This article presents an agent architecture for controlling an autonomous agent in stochas-
tic environments. The architecture combines the partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP) model with the belief-desire-intention (BDI) framework. The Hybrid
POMDP-BDI agent architecture takes the best features from the two approaches, that is,
the online generation of reward-maximizing courses of action from POMDP theory, and
sophisticated multiple goal management from BDI theory. We introduce the advances
made since the introduction of the basic architecture, including (i) the ability to pursue
multiple goals simultaneously and (ii) a plan library for storing pre-written plans and for
storing recently generated plans for future reuse. A version of the architecture without
the plan library is implemented and is evaluated using simulations. The results of the
simulation experiments indicate that the approach is feasible.
Keywords: Autonomous Agents, POMDP, BDI, Satisfaction, Plans, Planning, Memory
1 Introduction
Imagine a scenario where a planetary rover has five tasks of varying importance. The tasks
could be, for instance, collecting gas (for industrial use) from a natural vent at the base of a
hill, taking a temperature measurement at the top of the hill, performing self-diagnostics and
repairs, reloading its batteries at the solar charging station and collect soil samples wherever the
rover is. The rover is programmed to know the relative importance of collecting soil samples.
The rover also has a model of the probabilities with which its various actuators fail and the
probabilistic noise-profile of its various sensors. The rover must be able to reason (plan) in
real-time to pursue the right task at the right time while considering its resources and dealing
with various events, all while considering the uncertainties about its actions (actuators) and
perceptions (sensors).
We propose an architecture for the proper control of an agent in a complex environment such
as the scenario described above. The architecture combines belief-desire-intention (BDI) theory
(Bratman, 1987; Rao and Georgeff, 1995) and partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDPs) (Monahan, 1982; Lovejoy, 1991). Traditional BDI architectures (BDIAs) cannot
deal with probabilistic uncertainties and they do not generate plans in real-time. A traditional
POMDP cannot manage goals (major and minor tasks) as well as BDIAs can. Next, we analyse
the POMDPs and BDIAs in a little more detail.
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One of the benefits of agents based on BDI theory, is that they need not generate plans
from scratch; their plans are already (partially) compiled, and they can act quickly once a
goal is focused on. Furthermore, the BDI framework can deal with multiple goals. However,
their plans are usually not optimal, and it may be difficult to find a plan which is applicable
to the current situation. That is, the agent may not have a plan in its library which exactly
‘matches’ what it ideally wants to achieve. On the other hand, POMDPs can generate optimal
policies on the spot to be highly applicable to the current situation. Moreover, policies account
for stochastic actions in partially observable environments. Unfortunately, generating optimal
POMDP policies is usually intractable. One solution to the intractability of POMDP policy
generation is to employ a continuous planning strategy, or agent-centred search (Koenig, 2001).
Aligned with agent-centred search is the forward-search approach or online planning approach
in POMDPs (Ross et al., 2008).
The traditional BDIA maintains goals as desires ; there is no reward for performing some
action in some state. The reward function provided by POMDP theory is useful for modeling
certain kinds of behavior or preferences. For instance, an agent based on a POMDP may want
to avoid moist areas to prevent its parts becoming rusty. Moreover, a POMDP agent can
generate plans which can optimally avoid moist areas. But one would not say that avoiding
moist areas is the agent’s task. And POMDP theory maintains a single reward function; there
is no possibility of weighing alternative reward functions and pursuing one at a time for a fixed
period—all objectives must be considered simultaneously, in one reward function. Reasoning
about objectives in POMDP theory is not as sophisticated as in BDI theory. A BDI agent
cannot, however, simultaneously avoid moist areas and collect gas; it has to switch between
the two or combine the desire to avoid moist areas with every other goal.
The Hybrid POMDP-BDI agent architecture (or HPB architecture, for short) has recently
been introduced (Rens and Meyer, 2015). It combines the advantages of POMDP theoretic
reasoning and the potentially sophisticated means-ends reasoning of BDI theory in a coherent
agent architecture. In this paper, we generalize the management of goals by allowing for each
goal to be pursued with different intensities, yet concurrently.
Typically, BDI agents do not deal with stochastic uncertainty. Integrating POMDP notions
into a BDIA addresses this. For instance, an HPB agent will maintain a (subjective) belief state
representing its probabilistic (uncertain) belief about its current state. Planning with models
of stochastic actions and perceptions is possible in the HPB architecture. The tight integration
of POMDPs and BDIAs is novel to this architecture, especially in combination with desires
with changing intensity levels.
This article serves to introduce two significant extensions to the first iteration (Rens and
Meyer, 2015) of the HPB architecture. The first extension allows for multiple intentions to
be pursued simultaneously, instead of one at a time. In the previous architecture, only one
intention was actively pursued at any moment. In the new version, one agent action can take
an agent closer to more than one goal at the moment the action is performed – the result
of a new approach to planning. As a consequence of allowing multiple intentions, the policy
generation module (§ 4.3), the desire function and the method of focusing on intentions (§ 4.2)
had to be adapted. The second extension is the addition of a plan library. Previously, a
policy (conditional plan) would have to be generated periodically and regularly to supply the
agent with the recommendations of actions it needs to take. Although one of the strengths
of traditional BDI theory is the availability of a plan library with pre-written plans for quick
use, a plan library was excluded from the HPB architecture so as to simplify the architecture’s
introduction. Now we propose a framework where an agent designer can store hand-written
policies in a library of plans and where generated policies are stored for later reuse. Every
policy in the library is stored together with a ‘context’ in which it will be applicable and the
set of intentions which it is meant to satisfy. There are two advantages of introducing a plan
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library: (i) policies can be tailored by experts to achieve specific goals in particular contexts,
giving the agent immediate access to recommended courses of action in those situations, and
(ii) providing a means for policies, once generated, to be stored for later reuse so that the agent
can take advantage of past ‘experience’ – saving time and computation.
In Section 2, we review the necessary theory, including POMDP and BDI theory. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe the basic HPB architecture. The extensions to the basic architecture are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes two simulation experiments in which the proposed
architecture is tested, evaluating the performance on various dimensions. The results of the ex-
periments confirm that the approach may be useful in some domains. The last section discusses
some related work and points out some future directions for research in this area.
2 Preliminaries
The basic components of a BDI architecture (Wooldridge, 1999, 2002) are
• a set or knowledge-base B of beliefs;
• an option generation function wish, generating the objectives the agent would ideally like
to pursue (its desires);
• a set of desires D (goals to be achieved);
• a ‘focus’ function which selects intentions from the set of desires;
• a structure of intentions I of the most desirable options/desires returned by the focus
function;
• a library of plans and subplans;
• a ‘reconsideration’ function which decides whether to call the focus function;
• an execution procedure, which affects the world according to the plan associated with the
intention;
• a sensing or perception procedure, which gathers information about the state of the
environment; and
• a belief update function, which updates the agent’s beliefs according to its latest obser-
vations and actions.
Exactly how these components are implemented result in a particular BDI architecture.
Algorithm 1 (adapted from Wooldridge (2000, Fig. 2.3)) is a basic BDI agent control loop. pi
is the current plan to be executed. getPercept(·) senses the environment and returns a percept
(processed sensor data) which is an input to update(·), which updates the agent’s beliefs.
wish : B × I → D generates a set of desires, given the agent’s beliefs, current intentions and
possibly its innate motives. It is usually impractical for an agent to pursue the achievement of all
its desires. It must thus filter out the most valuable and achievable desires. This is the function
of focus : B×D×I → I, taking beliefs, desires and current intentions as parameters. Together,
the processes performed by wish and focus may be called deliberation, formally encapsulated
by the deliberate procedure. plan(·) returns a plan from the plan library to achieve the agent’s
current intentions.
A more sophisticated controller would have the agent consider whether to re-deliberate,
with a reconsider function placed just before deliberation would take place. The agent could
also test at every iteration through the main loop whether the currently pursued intention is
still possibly achievable. Serendipity could also be taken advantage of by periodically testing
whether the intention has been achieved, without the plan being fully executed. Such an
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Algorithm 1: Basic BDI agent control loop
Input: B0: initial beliefs
Input: I0: initial intentions
1 B ← B0;
2 I ← I0;
3 pi ← null ;
4 while alive do
5 p← getPercept();
6 B ← update(B, p);
7 D ← wish(B, I);
8 I ← focus(B,D, I);
9 pi ← plan(B, I);
10 execute(pi);
agent is considered ‘reactive’ because it executes one action per loop iteration; this allows for
deliberation between executions. There are various mechanisms which an agent might use
to decide when to reconsider its intentions. See, for instance, Bratman (1987); Pollack and
Ringuette (1990); Kinny and Georgeff (1991, 1992); Schut and Wooldridge (2000, 2001); Schut
et al. (2004).
In a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), the actions the agent performs
have non-deterministic effects in the sense that the agent can only predict with a likelihood in
which state it will end up after performing an action. Furthermore, its perception is noisy. That
is, when the agent uses its sensors to determine in which state it is, it will have a probability
distribution over a set of possible states to reflect its conviction for being in each state.
Formally (Kaelbling et al., 1998), a POMDP is a tuple 〈S,A, T,R, Z, P, b0〉 with
• S, a finite set of states of the world (that the agent can be in),
• A a finite set of actions (that the agent can choose to execute),
• a transition function T (s, a, s′), the probability of being in s′ after performing action a in
state s,
• R(a, s), the immediate reward gained for executing action a while in state s,
• Z, a finite set of observations the agent can perceive in its world,
• a perception function P (s′, a, z), the probability of observing z in state s′ resulting from
performing action a in some other state, and
• b0 the initial probability distribution over all states in S.
In general, we regard an observation as the signal recognized by a sensor; the signal is
generated by some event which is not directly perceivable.
A belief state b is a set of pairs 〈s, p〉 where each state s in b is associated with a probability
p. All probabilities must sum up to one, hence, b forms a probability distribution over the set S
of all states. To update the agent’s beliefs about the world, a special function SE (z, a, b) = bn
is defined as
bn(s
′) =
P (s′, a, z)
∑
s∈S T (s, a, s
′)b(s)
Pr(z|a, b) , (1)
where a is an action performed in ‘current’ belief state b, z is the resultant observation and
bn(s
′) denotes the probability of the agent being in state s′ in ‘new’ belief state bn. Note that
Pr(z | a, b) is a normalizing constant.
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Let the planning horizon h (also called the look-ahead depth) be the number of future steps
the agent plans ahead each time it plans. V ∗(b, h) is the optimal value of future courses of
actions the agent can take with respect to a finite horizon h starting in belief state b. This
function assumes that at each step the action that will maximize the state’s value will be
selected.
Because the reward function R(a, s) provides feedback about the utility of a particular state
s (due to a executed in it), an agent who does not know in which state it is in cannot use this
reward function directly. The agent must consider, for each state s, the probability b(s) of
being in s, according to its current belief state b. Hence, a belief reward function ρ(a, b) is
defined, which takes a belief state as argument. Let ρ(a, b) :=
∑
s∈S R(a, s)b(s).
The optimal state-value function is define by
V ∗(b, h) := max
a∈A
[
ρ(a, b) + γ
∑
z∈Z
Pr(z | a, b)V ∗(SE (z, a, b), h− 1)
]
,
where 0 ≤ γ < 1 is a factor to discount the value of future rewards and Pr(z | a, b) denotes the
probability of reaching belief state bn = SE (z, a, b). While V
∗ denotes the optimal value of a
belief state, function Q∗ denotes the optimal action-value:
Q∗(a, b, h) := ρ(a, b) + γ
∑
z∈Z
Pr(z | a, b)V ∗(SE (z, a, b), h− 1)
is the value of executing a in the current belief state, plus the total expected value of belief
states reached thereafter.
3 The Basic HPB Architecture
In BDI theory, one of the big challenges is to know when the agent should switch its current
goal and what its new goal should be (Schut et al., 2004). To address this challenge, we propose
that an agent should maintain intensity levels of desire for every goal. This intensity of desire
could be interpreted as a kind of emotion. The goals most intensely desired should be the goals
sought (the agent’s intentions). We also define the notion of how much an intention is satisfied
in the agent’s current belief state. For instance, suppose that out of five possible goals, the
agent currently most desires to watch a film and to eat a snack. Then these two goals become
the agent’s intentions. However, eating is not allowed inside the film-theatre, and if the agent
were to go buy a snack it would miss the beginning of the film. So the total reward for first
watching the film then buying and eating a snack is higher than first eating then watching. As
soon as the film-watching goal is satisfied, it is no longer an intention. But while the agent
was watching the film, the desire-level of the (non-intention) goal of being at home has been
increasing. However, it cannot become an intention because snack-eating has not yet been
satisfied. Going home cannot simply become an intention and dominate snack-eating, because
the architecture is designed so that current intentions have precedence over non-intention goals,
else there is a danger that the agent will vacillate between which goals to pursue. Nonetheless,
snack-eating may be ejected from the set of intentions under the special condition that the
agent is having an unusually hard time achieving it. For instance, if someone stole its wallet in
the theatre, the agent can no longer have the current intention (i.e., actively pursue) eating a
snack. Hence, in our architecture, if an intention takes ‘too long’ to satisfy, it is removed from
the set of intentions. As soon as the agent gets home or is close to home, the snack-eating goal
will probably become an intention again and the agent will start making plans to satisfy eating
a snack. Moreover, the desire-level of snack-eating will now be very high (it has been steadily
increasing) and the agent’s actions will be biased towards satisfying this intention over other
current intentions (e.g., over getting home, if it is not yet there).
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A Hybrid POMDP-BDI (HPB) agent (Rens and Meyer, 2015) maintains (i) a belief state
which is periodically updated, (ii) a mapping from goals to numbers representing the level of
desire to achieve the goals, and (iii) the current set of intentions, the goals with the highest desire
levels (roughly speaking). As the agent acts, its desire levels are updated and it may consider
choosing new intentions and discard others based on new desire levels. Refer to Figure 1 for
an overview of the operational semantics. The figure refers to concepts defined in the following
subsection.
3.1 Declarative Semantics
The state of an HPB agent is defined by the tuple 〈B,D, I〉, where B is the agent’s current
belief state (i.e., a probability distribution over the states S, defined below), D is the agent’s
current desire function and I is the agent’s current intention. More will be said about D and
I a little later.
An HPB agent could be defined by the tuple 〈Atrb, G,A, Z, T, P,Util〉, where
• Atrb is a set of attribute-sort pairs (for short, the attribute set). For every (atrb : sort) ∈
Atrb, atrb is the name or identifier of an attribute of interest in the domain of interest,
like BatryLevel or Direction, and sort is the set from which atrb can take a value, for
instance, real numbers in the range [0, 55] or a list of values like {North, East, West,
South}. So {(BatryLevel : [0, 55]), (Direction : {North, East, West, South})} could be
an attribute set.
A state s is induced from Atrb as one possible way of assigning values to attributes:
s = {(atrb : v) | (atrb : sort) ∈ Atrb, v ∈ sort , if (atrb : v), (atrb ′ : v′) ∈ s and
atrb = atrb ′, then v = v′}. The set of all possible states is denoted S.
• G is a set of goals. A goal is a subset of some state s ∈ S. For instance, {(BatryLevel :
13), (Direction : South)} is a goal, and so are {(BatryLevel : 33)} and {(Direction :
West)}. The set of goals is given by the agent designer as ‘instructions’ about the agent’s
tasks.
• A is a finite set of actions.
• Z is a finite set of observations.
• T is the transition function of POMDPs.
• P is the perception function of POMDPs.
• Util consists of two functions Pref and Satf which allow an agent to determine the utilities
of alternative sequences of actions. Util = 〈Pref , Satf 〉.
Pref is the preference function with a range in R ∩ [0, 1]. It takes an action a and a
state s, and returns the preference (any real number) for performing a in s. That is,
Pref (a, s) ∈ [0, 1]. Numbers closer to 1 imply greater preference and numbers closer to 0
imply less preference. Except for the range restriction of [0, 1], it has the same definition as
a POMDP reward function, but its name indicates that it models the agent’s preferences
and not what is typically thought of as rewards. An HPB agent gets ‘rewarded’ by
achieving its goals. The preference function is especially important to model action costs;
the agent should prefer ‘inexpensive’ actions. Pref has a local flavor. Designing the
preference function to have a value lying in [0,1] may sometimes be challenging, but we
believe it is always possible.
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Refocus
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Figure 1: Operational semantics of the basic HPB architecture. SL stands for Satf levels . Note
that Satf levels depends on the current belief state and not on desire levels. Planning is also
independent of desire levels. The focus function depends on desire levels and on satisfaction
levels. In the case of plans consisting of a single action, the Replan decision node always returns
‘yes’.
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Satf is the satisfaction function with a range in R∩[0, 1]. It takes a state s and an intention
I, and returns a value representing the degree to which the state satisfies the intention.
That is, Satf (I, s) ∈ [0, 1]. It is completely up to the agent designer to decide how the
satisfaction function is defined, as long as numbers closer to 1 mean more satisfaction and
numbers closer to 0 mean less satisfaction. Satf has a global flavor.
Figure 1 shows a flow diagram representing the operational semantics of the basic HPB
architecture.
3.2 The Desire Function
The desire function D is a total function from goals in G into the positive real numbers R+. The
real number represents the intensity or level of desire of the goal. For instance, ({(BatryLevel :
13), (WeekDay : Tue)}, 2.2) could be in D, meaning that the goal of having the battery level
at 13 and the week-day Tuesday is desired with a level of 2.2. ({(BatryLevel : 33)}, 56) and
({(WeekDay : Wed)}, 444) are also examples of desires in D.
I is the agent’s current intention; an element of G; the goal with the highest desire level.
This goal will be actively pursued by the agent, shifting the importance of the other goals to the
background. The fact that only one intention is maintained makes the HPB agent architecture
quite different to standard BDIAs.
We propose the following desire update rule.
D(g)← D(g) + 1− Satf β(g,B) (2)
Rule 2 is defined so that as Satf β(g,B) tends to one (total satisfaction), the intensity with which
the incumbent goal is desired does not increase. On the other hand, as Satf β(g,B) becomes
smaller (more dissatisfaction), the goal’s intensity is incremented. The rule transforms D with
respect to B and g. A goal’s intensity should drop the more it is being satisfied. The update
rule thus defines how a goal’s intensity changes over time with respect to satisfaction.
Note that desire levels never decrease. This does not reflect reality. It is however convenient
to represent the intensity of desires like this: only relative differences in desire levels matter in
our approach and we want to avoid unnecessarily complicating the architecture.
3.3 Focusing and Satisfaction Levels
Focus is a function which returns one member of G called the (current) intention I. In the
initial version of the architecture, the goal selected is the one with the highest desire level. After
every execution of an action in the real-world, Refocus is called to decide whether to call Focus
to select a new intention. Refocus is a meta-reasoning function analogous to the reconsider
function mentioned in Section 2. It is important to keep the agent focused on one goal long
enough to give it a reasonable chance of achieving it. It is the job of Refocus to recognize when
the current intention seems impossible or too expensive to achieve.
Let Satf levels be the sequence of satisfaction levels of the current intention since it became
active and let MRY be a designer-specified number representing the length of a sub-sequence
of Satf levels—the MRY last satisfaction levels.
One possible definition of Refocus is
Refocus(c, θ)
def
=

‘no’ if |Satf levels| < MRY
‘yes’ if c < θ
‘no’ otherwise,
where c is the average change from one satisfaction level to the next in the agent’s ‘memory’
MRY , and θ is some threshold, for instance, 0.05. If the agent is expected to increase its
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satisfaction by at least, say, 0.1 on average for the current intention, then θ should be set to
0.1. With this approach, if the agent ‘gets stuck’ trying to achieve its current intention, it will
not blindly keep on trying to achieve it, but will start pursuing another goal (with the highest
desire level). Some experimentation will likely be necessary for the agent designer to determine
a good value for θ in the application domain.
Note that if an intention was not well satisfied, its desire level still increases at a relatively
high rate. So whenever the agent focuses again, a goal not well satisfied in the past will be a
top contender to become the intention (again).
3.4 Planning for the Next Action
A basic HPB agent controls its behaviour according to the policies it generates. Plan is a
procedure which generates a POMDP policy pi of depth h. Essentially, we want to consider
all action sequences of length h and the belief states in which the agent would find itself if
it followed the sequences. Then we want to choose the sequence (or at least its first action)
which yields the least cost and which ends in the belief state most satisfying with respect to
the intention.
Planning occurs over an agents belief states. The satisfaction and preference functions thus
need to be defined for belief states: The satisfaction an agent gets for an intention in its current
belief state is defined as
Satf β(I, B) :=
∑
s∈S
Satf (I, s)B(s),
where Satf (I, s) is defined above and B(s) is the probability of being in state s. The definition
of Pref β has the same form as the reward function ρ over belief states in POMDP theory:
Pref β(a,B) :=
∑
s∈S
Pref (a, s)B(s),
where Pref (a, s) was discussed above.
During planning, preferences and intention satisfaction must be maximized. The main
function used in the Plan procedure is the HPB action-state value function Q∗HPB , giving the
value of some action a, conditioned on the current belief state B, intention I and look-ahead
depth h:
Q∗HPB(a,B, I, h) := αSatf β(I, B) + (1− α)Pref β(a,B)
+ γ
∑
z∈Z
Pr(z | a,B) max
a′∈A
Q∗HPB(a
′, B′, I, h− 1),
Q∗HPB(a,B, I, 1) := αSatf β(I, B) + (1− α)Pref β(a,B),
where B′ = SE (a, z, B), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the goal/preference ‘trade-off’ factor, γ is the normal
POMDP discount factor and SE is the normal POMDP state estimation function.
Plan returns arg maxa∈AQ
∗
HPB(a,B, I, h), the trivial policy of a single action.
4 The Extended HPB Architecture
The operational semantics of the extended architecture is essentially the same as for the first
version, except that a plan library is now involved. The agent starts off with an initial set of
intentions, a subset of its goals. For the current set of intentions, it must either select a plan
from the plan library or generate a plan to pursue all its intentions. At every iteration of the
agent’s control loop, an action is performed, an observation is made, the belief state is updated,
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and a decision is made whether to modify the set of intentions. But only when the current
policy (conditional plan) is ‘exhausted’ does the agent seek a new policy, by consulting its plan
library, and if an adequate policy is not found, generating one.
In the next subsection, we introduce some new notation and changes made to the archi-
tecture. Section 4.2 discusses how the focussing procedure must change to accommodate the
changes. Section 4.3 explains how policies are generated for simultaneous pursuit of multiple
goals. Finally, Section 4.4 presents the plan library, which was previously unavailable, and how
the agent and agent designer can use it to their benefit.
4.1 Prologue
The HPB agent model gets three new component – a goal weight function W , a compatibility
function Cpbl and the plan library Lbry . It can thus be defined by the tuple 〈Atrb, G, W ,
Cpbl , A, Z, T , P , Util , Lbry〉.
In the previous version, satisfaction and preference were traded-off by “trade-off factor”
which was not explicitly mentioned in the agent model. Actually the trade-off factor should
have been part of the model, because it must be provided by the agent designer, and it directly
affects the agent’s behaviour. In the new version, every goal g ∈ G will be weighted by W (g)
according to the importance of g to the agent. Goal weights are constrained such that W (g) > 0
for all g ∈ G, and ∑g∈GW (g) = 1.
The third fundamental extension is that I becomes a set of intentions. In this way, an HPB
agent may actively pursue several goals simultaneously. For example, a planetary rover may
want to travel to its recharging station and simultaneously make same atmospheric measure-
ments en route.
The first version has also been changed so that the set of goals G is simply a set of names,
rather than restricting a goal to be a set of attribute values, as was previously done. Goals
are defined by how they are used in the architecture, particularly by their involvement in the
definition of satisfaction functions.
In the extended architecture, it will be convenient to use more compact notation: Here
we let Util = 〈κ, σ〉, where κ is the same as Pref and σ is a set of satisfaction functions
{σg | g ∈ G, σg = Satf (g)}. In particular, we move away from a preference function, and rather
think of a cost function κ. Preferences will be captured by the set of satisfaction functions.
As a consequence of being able to pursue several goals at the same time, there exists a
danger that the agent will pursue one intention when it necessarily causes another intention
to become less satisfied. For instance, visiting the USA regional headquarters is diametrically
opposite to visiting the China regional headquarters at the same time. Other examples of goals
which should be ‘disjoint’ are work−in−garden and have−lunch, and recharge−battery
and replace−battery. The solution we use is to list, for each goal g ∈ G, all other goals
which are compatible with it, in the sense that their simultaneous pursuit ‘effective’ (defined
by the agent designer). Let Cpbl(g) denote the set of goals compatible with g. It is mandatory
that g ∈ Cpbl(g). Two goals g and g′ are called incompatible if and only if g′ 6∈ Cpbl(g) or
g 6∈ Cpbl(g′).
Suppose G = {visit−USA−HQ, visit−China−HQ, work−in−garden, have−lunch,
recharge−battery, replace−battery}. Then an agent designer may specify
Cpbl(visit−USA−HQ) = {visit−USA−HQ, have−lunch}
and
Cpbl(recharge−battery) = {recharge−battery, work−in−garden, have−lunch}.
Note that work−in−garden and have−lunch are incompatible.
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4.2 A New Approach to Focusing
Given that I is a set of intentions, ensuring that the ‘correct’ goals are intentions at the ‘right’
time to ensure that the agent behaves as desired, requires some careful thought. It is still
important to keep the agent focused on one intention long enough to give it a reasonable
chance of achieving it, temporarily stop pursuing intentions it is struggling to achieve.
The HPB architecture does not have a focus function which returns a subset of G of inten-
tions I. Rather, we have a set of procedures which decide at each iteration which intention to
remove from I (if any) and which goal to add to I (if any). Incompatible must also be dealt
with.
Let Satf levels(g) be the sequence of satisfaction levels of some goal g ∈ I since g became
active (i.e., was added to I) and let MRY be a number representing the length of a sub-sequence
of Satf levels(g)—the MRY last satisfaction levels of goal g. Remove is defined exactly like
Refocus :
Remove(g, I) :=

‘no’ if |Satf levels(g)| < MRY (g)
‘yes’ if δ(g) < θ
‘no’ otherwise,
where δ(g) is the average change from one satisfaction level of g to the next in the agent’s
‘memory’, and θ is the threshold above which δ(g) must be for g to remain an intention.
Let MI be the currently most intense goal defined as
MI := arg max
g∈G
D(g).
We define two focusing strategies for sets of intentions: the over-optimistic strategy and the
compatibility strategy.
4.2.1 Over-optimistic Strategy
This strategy ignores compatibility issues between goals. In this sense, the agent is (over)
optimistic that it can successfully simultaneously pursue goals which are incompatible.
Add MI to I only if MI 6∈ I. If MI is added to I, clear MI ’s record of satisfaction levels,
that is, let Satf levels(MI ) be the empty sequence.
Next: For every g ∈ I, if |I| > 1 and Remove(g, I) returns ‘yes’, then remove g from I.
4.2.2 Compatibility Strategy
Add MI to I only if MI 6∈ I and there does not exists a g ∈ I such that g 6∈ Cpbl(MI ). If MI
is added to I, clear MI ’s record of satisfaction levels, that is, let Satf levels(MI ) be the empty
sequence.
Next: For every g ∈ I, if |I| > 1 and Remove(g, I) returns ‘yes’, then remove g from I.
There is one case which must still be dealt with in the compatibility strategy: Suppose for
some g ∈ G, g¯ 6∈ Cpbl(g). Further suppose that I = {g¯} (i.e., |I| = 1) and g is and remains
the most intensely desired goal. Now, g may not be added to I because it is incompatible with
g¯, no other goal will be attempted to be added to I and g¯ may not be removed while it is the
only intention, even if Remove(g¯, I) returns ‘yes’. What could easily happen in this case is
that g will continually increase in desire level, g¯’s average satisfaction level will remain below
the change threshold (i.e., δ(g¯) < θ remains true), and the agent continues to pursue only g¯.
To remedy this ‘locked’ situation, the following procedure is run after the previous ‘add’ and
‘remove’ procedures are attempted. If I = {g¯}, g¯ 6∈ Cpbl(MI ) and Remove(g¯, I) returns ‘yes’,
then remove g¯ from I, add MI to I and clear MI ’s record of satisfaction levels.
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4.2.3 A New Desire Function
The old rule (in new notation) is still available:
D(g)← D(g) +W (g)(1− σgβ(B)). (3)
We have found through experimentation that when an intention-goal’s desire levels are
updated, non-intention-goals may not get the opportunity to become intentions. In other words,
it may happen that whenever new non-intention-goals are considered to become intentions, they
are always ‘dominated’ by goals with higher levels of desire which are already intentions. By
disallowing intentions’ desire levels to increase, non-intentions get the opportunity to ‘catch up’
with their desire levels. A new form of the desire update rule is thus proposed for this version
of the architecture:
D(g)← D(g) + (1− i(I, g))W (g)(1− σgβ(B)) (4)
The term (1− i(I, g)) in (4) ensures that a goal’s desire level changes if and only if the goal is
not an intention.
Both forms of the rule are defined so that as σgβ(B) tends to one (total satisfaction), the
intensity with which the incumbent goal is desired does not increase. On the other hand, as
σgβ(B) becomes smaller (more dissatisfaction), the goal’s intensity is incremented—by at most
its weight of importance W (g). A goal’s intensity should drop the more it is being satisfied.
However, update rule (3) which is independent of whether a goal is an intention may still
result in better performance in particular domains. (This question needs more research.) It is
thus left up to the agent designer to desire which form of the rule better suits the application
domain.
4.3 Planning by Policy Generation
In this section, we shall see how the planner can be extended to compute a policy which
pursues several goals simultaneously. Goal weights are also incorporated into the action-state
value function.
The satisfaction an agent gets for an intention g at its current belief state is defined as
σgβ(B) :=
∑
s∈S
σg(s)B(s),
where σg(s) is defined above and B(s) is the probability of being in state s. The definition of
κβ has the same form as the reward function ρ over belief states in POMDP theory:
κβ(a,B) :=
∑
s∈S
κ(a, s)B(s),
where κ(a, s) was discussed above.
The main function used in the Plan procedure is the HPB action-state value function Q∗HPB ,
giving the value of some action a, conditioned on the current belief state B and look-ahead
depth h:
Q∗HPB(a,B, I, h) := i(I, g1)W (g1)σ
g1
β (B) + · · ·+ i(I, gn)W (gn)σgnβ (B)− κβ(a,B)
+ γ
∑
z∈Z
Pr(z | a,B) max
a′∈A
Q∗HPB(a
′, B′, I, h− 1),
Q∗HPB(a,B, I, 1) := i(I, g1)W (g1)σ
g1
β (B) + · · ·+ i(I, gn)W (gn)σgnβ (B)− κβ(a,B),
where
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Figure 2: An example policy of depth 3.
• i(I, gj) = 1 if gj ∈ I, else i(I, gj) = 0 if gj 6∈ I,
• 〈g1, . . . , gn〉 is an ordering of the goals in G,
• σgβ(·) and κβ(·) are the expected (w.r.t. a belief state) values of σg(·), resp., κ(·),
• B′ = SE (a, z, B),
• γ is the normal POMDP discount factor and
• SE is the normal POMDP state estimation function.
Now, instead of Plan returning a single action (assuming h > 1), Plan generates a tree-
structures plan of depth h, conditioned on observations, that is, a policy. With a policy of depth
h, an agent can execute a sequence of h actions, where the choice of exactly which action to
take at each step depends on the observation received just prior. arg maxa∈A Q
∗
HPB(a,B, I, h)
is used at every choice point to construct the policy.
Figure 4.3 is a graphical example of a policy with two actions and two observations. The
agent is assumed to be in belief state Bcur when the policy is generated. At every belief state
node (triangles), the optimal action is recommended. After an action is performed, all/both
observations are possible and thus considered. There is thus a choice at every ◦ node; however,
it is not a choice for the agent, rather, it is a choice for the environment which observation to
send to the agent. Given the action performed, for every possible observation, a different belief
state is generated. At every . node (belief state), arg maxa∈A Q
∗
HPB(a, ., I, h) is applied to
determine the action to perform there. (In theory, the agent can choose to perform any action
at these . nodes, but our agent will take the recommendations of POMDP theory for optimal
behavior.) The agent will perform act2 first, then depending on whether obs1 or obs2 in
sensed, the agent should next (according to the policy) perform act2, respectively, act1. Then
a third action will be performed according to the policy and conditional on which observation
is sensed.
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4.4 Introducing a Plan Library
Another extension of the basic architecture is that a language based on the attributes is intro-
duced. The language L is the set of all sentences. Let φ and ψ be sentences. Then the following
are also sentences.
• true,
• (atrb : v), i.e., an attribute-value pair,
• φ ∧ ψ,
• φ ∨ ψ,
• ¬φ.
If a sentence φ is satisfied or true in a state s, we write s  φ. The semantics of L is defined by
• s  true always,
• s  (atrb : v) ⇐⇒ (atrb : v) ∈ s,
• s  φ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ s  φ and s  ψ,
• s  φ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ s  φ or s  ψ,
• s  ¬φ ⇐⇒ not s  φ.
Let Φ be a sentence in L. When a sentence in L appears in a written policy (see below), it
is called a context.
We define two kinds of plans: an attribute condition plan is a triple I : Φ : pi, and a belief
state condition plan is a triple I : B : pi, where I is a set of intentions, pi is a POMDP policy,
Φ is a context and B is a belief state. All plans are stored in a plan library.
The idea is that attribute condition plans (abbreviation: a-plans) are written by agent
designers and are available for use when the agent is deployed. Roughly speaking, belief state
condition plans (abbreviation: b-plans) are automatically generated by a POMDP planner and
stored when no a-plan is found which ‘matches’ the agent’s current belief state and intention
set.
Policies in a-plans are of two kinds:
Definition 1 (Most likely context) An a-plan most-likely-context policy is either an action
or has the form
a : {(Φ1, pi1), . . . , (Φn, pin)},
where a is an action, the Φi are contexts, and each of the pii is one of the two kinds of a-plan
policies.
At belief state B, the degree of belief of Φ is
Degree(Φ, B) :=
∑
s∈S,sΦ
B(s).
We abbreviate “most-likely-context” as ‘ml’. If an ml policy pi = a : ML is adopted for
execution and it is not simply an action, then a is executed, an observation is received, the
current belief state is updated to B′ and finally the policy which is paired with the most likely
context is executed – that is,
arg max
pi′: (Φ′,pi′)∈ML
Degree(Φ′, B′)
is executed.
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Definition 2 (First applicable context) An a-plan first-applicable-context policy is either
an action or has the form
a : 〈(Φ1 ./ p1, pi1), . . . , (Φn ./ pn, pin)〉,
where a is an action, the Φi are contexts, ./:= {≤,≥}, the pi are probabilities, and each of the
pii is one of the two kinds of a-plan policies.
We abbreviate “first-applicable-context” as ‘fa’. If an fa policy pi = a : FA is adopted for
execution and it is not simply an action, then a is executed, an observation is received, the
current belief state is updated to B′ and finally the policy which is paired with the first con-
text which satisfies its probability inequality is executed - that is, pii is executed such that
Degree(Φi, B
′) ./ pi and (Φi ./ pi, pii) ∈ FA and there is no (Φj ./ pj, pij) ∈ FA such that j < i
for which Degree(Φj, B
′) ./ pj. If no context in the sequence 〈(Φ1 ./ p1, pi1), . . . , (Φn ./ pn, pin)〉
satisfies its inequality, the a-plan of which the policy is a part is regarded as having finished,
that is, the control loop is then in a position where a fresh plan in the plan library is sought.
In the following example a-plan policy, an agent must move around in a six-by-six grid
world to collect items. Suppose the plan selected from the library is I : Φ : pi with I being
{six−one, collect}, Φ being
((direction : North) ∨ (direction : West)) ∧ ¬(x−coord : 6) ∧ ¬(y−coord : 1)
and pi being
move−forward : {
((item−here : yes), take−item),
((item−here : no), move−forward : 〈
((x−coord : 6), (direction : North) ≥ 0.9, turn−left),
((y−coord : 1), (direction : West) ≥ 0.9, turn−right),
(true ≤ 1), move−forward)〉}
One can see that pi itself is an ml policy, but embedded inside it is an fa policy.
Suppose that the agent currently has a belief state Bcur and an intention set Icur . First,
the agent will scan through all a-plans, selecting all those which ‘match’ Icur . From this set,
the agent will execute the policy pi of the a-plan I : Φ : pi whose attribute condition has the
highest degree of belief at Bcur . If the set of a-plans matching Icur is empty, the agent will scan
through all b-plans, selecting all those which ‘match’ Icur . From this set, the agent will execute
the policy pi of the b-plan I : B : pi whose belief state is ‘most similar’ to Bcur . If the set of
b-plans matching Icur is empty, or there is no b-plan with belief state similar to Bcur , then the
agent will generate policy picur , execute it and store Icur : Bcur : picur in the plan library for
possible reuse later. The high-level planning process is depicted by the diagram in Figure 3.
To “execute policy pi” (where pi has horizon/depth h) means to perform h actions as rec-
ommended by pi. No policy will be sought in the library, nor will a new policy be generated
until the action recommendations of the current policy being executed have been ‘exhausted’.
One may be concerned that a policy becomes ‘stale’ or inapplicable while being executed, and
that seeking or generating ‘fresh’ policies at every iteration keeps action selection relevant in
a dynamic world. However, written policies (in a-plans) should preferably have the form of
generated policies, and generated policies (in b-plans) can deal with all situations understood
by the agent: It is assumed that each observation distinguishable by the agent, identifies a
particular state of the world, as far as the agent’s sensors allow. Hence, if a policy considers
every observation at its choice nodes, the policy will have a recommended (for written policies)
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Figure 3: A flow diagram of the planning process in the new version of the HPB agent archi-
tecture.
or optimal (for generated policies) action, no matter the state of the world. However, writing
or generating policies with far horizons (e.g., h > 7) is impractical. With large h, an agent will
take relatively long to generate a policy and thus lose its reactiveness. Reactiveness is especially
important in highly dynamic environments.
With respect to a-plans, whether two intention sets match will be determined by how many
goals they have in common. Thus, the similarity between Icur and I lib can be determined as
follows.
IS (Icur , I lib) :=
∑
g∈G,g∈Icur ,g∈I lib 1
|Icur ∪ I lib| .
IS (·) lies in [0, 1]. Icur and I lib need not have equal cardinality. Larger values of IS (·) mean
more similarity / closer match. The agent designer can decide what value of IS (I, I ′) constitutes
a ‘match’ between I and I ′ (see the discussion on “thresholds” below).
What constitutes a match between intention sets with respect to b-plans is different: Policies
generated at two times t and t′ might be significantly different for the same (similar) context(s)
if the satisfaction levels of the intentions are significantly different at the two times. This
is an important insight because policies of b-plans are generated, not written. Even though
IS (Icur , I lib) may constitute a ‘match’ (with I lib in a b-plan), pilib might be completely im-
practical for pursuing Icur . The measure of similarity will be the sum of differences between
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Algorithm 2: FindPolicy
Input: Bcur : current belief state
Input: Icur : current intention set
Input: θi: intention-set threshold
Input: θb: belief state threshold
Input: PlanLib: the plan library
Input: h: planning horizon / policy depth
Output: A POMDP policy of depth h
1 ApplicablePlans ← {I lib : Φ : pilib ∈ PlanLib | IS (Icur , I lib) ≥ θi};
2 if ApplicablePlans 6= ∅ then
3 return arg maxpilib: Ilib:Φ:pilib∈ApplicablePlans Degree(Φ, B
cur);
4 if ApplicablePlans = ∅ then
5 ApplicablePlans ← {I lib : Blib : pilib ∈ PlanLib | BS (Icur , I lib , Bcur, Blib) ≥ θi};
6 if ApplicablePlans 6= ∅ then
7 ApplicablePlans ← {I lib : Blib : pilib ∈ ApplicablePlans | R′(Blib, Bcur) ≥ θb};
8 if ApplicablePlans 6= ∅ then
9 return arg maxpilib: Ilib:Blib:pilib∈ApplicablePlans R
′(Blib, Bcur);
10 if ApplicablePlans = ∅ then
11 picur ← Policy(Bcur , Icur , h);
12 Add Icur : Bcur : picur to PlanLib;
13 return picur;
satisfaction levels. Note that an intention’s satisfaction levels can only be compared if the
intention appears in both intention sets under consideration. We denote the similarity between
two intention sets Icur and I lib as BS (Icur , I lib , Bcur , Blib) and define it as follows.
BS (Icur , I lib , Bcur , Blib) :=
∑
g∈G,g∈Icur ,g∈I lib 1− ||σg(Bcur)− σg(Blib)||
|Icur ∪ I lib| .
where ||x|| denotes the absolute value of x. BS (·) lies in [0, 1]. Icur and I lib need not have equal
cardinality. Larger values of BS (·) mean more similarity / closer match. The agent designer
can decide what value of BS (I, I ′) constitutes a ‘match’ between I and I ′.
For a fixed pair of intention sets, BS (Icur , I lib , Bcur , Blib) ≤ IS (Icur , I lib). That is, BS (·) is
a stronger measure of similarity than IS (·). This is because with BS (·), intention satisfaction
levels must also be similar. The stronger measure is required to filter out b-plans that seem
similar when judged only on the commonality of their intentions, but not on their satisfaction
levels. And there may be several b-plans in the library which would be judged similar by IS (·),
but they have been added to the library exactly because they are indeed different when their
satisfaction levels are taken into account. The following example should make this clear. Sup-
pose that the following two b-plans are in the library: {g1, g4} : B1 : pi1 and {g1, g4} : B2 : pi2,
where B1 = {(s1, 0.95), (s2, 0.05), (s3, 0), (s4, 0)} and B2 = {(s1, 0), (s2, 0), (s3, 0.05), (s4, 0.95)}.
And suppose g1 is most satisfied when the agent is in s1, and g4 is most satisfied when the agent
is in s4. A policy to pursue {g1, g4} when starting in B1 would rather suggest actions to move
towards s4, while a policy to pursue {g1, g4} when starting in B2 would rather suggest actions
to move towards s1. The point is that although the two b-plans are identical with respect to
the intention set, they have very different policies, due to their different belief states (and thus
satisfaction levels).
17
We now prepare for the definition of similarity between two belief states. The ‘directed
divergence’ (Kullback, 1968; Csisza´r, 1975) of belief state C from belief state B is defined as
R(C,B) :=
∑
s∈S
C(s) ln
C(s)
B(s)
.
R(C,B) is undefined when B(s) = 0 while C(s) > 0. When C(s) = 0, then R(C,B) = 0
because limx→0 ln(x) = 0. Let
Π(B) := {C ′ ∈ Π | ∀s ∈ S, if C ′(s) > 0, then B(s) > 0},
where Π is the set of all probability distributions over the states S (i.e., all belief states which
can be induced from S). That is, Π(B) is the set of belief states which keep R(C ′, B) defined.
Let
maxR(B) := max
C′∈Π(B)
R(C ′, B),
For our purposes, we can define R(C,B) as maxR(C,B) whenever it would normally be unde-
fined. We define a slightly modified cross-entropy R′ as
R′(C,B) :=
{
R(C,B) if R(C,B) is defined
maxR(B) otherwise
Finally, the similarity between the current belief state Bcur and the belief state Blib in a plan
in the library is R′(Blib, Bcur).
Two thresholds are involved with determining when library plans are applicable and how
plans are dealt with: the intention-set threshold (abbreviation: θi) and the belief-state threshold
(abbreviation: θb). The former is involved in both a-plans and b-plans, and the latter is involved
only in b-plans.
The FindPolicy procedure (Algo. 2) formally defines what policy the agent will execute
whenever the agent seeks a policy, and the procedure defines when and how new plans are
added to the plan library.
5 Simulations
We performed some tests on an HPB agent in two domains: a six-by-six grid-world and a
three-battery system. In the experiments which follow, the threshold θ is set to 0.05, MRY is
set to 5 and h = 3. Desire levels are initially set to zero for all goals. For each experiment, 10
trials were run. The plan library is not made use of.
In the grid-world, the agent’s task is to visit each of the four corners, and to collect twelve
items randomly scattered. The goals are {(1, 1), (1, 6), (6, 1), (6, 6), collect}, and (1, 1), (1, 6),
(6, 1) and (6, 6) are marked mutually incompatible. That is,
• Cpbl((1, 1)) = {(1, 1), collect},
• Cpbl((1, 6)) = {(1, 6), collect},
• Cpbl((6, 1)) = {(6, 1), collect},
• Cpbl((6, 6)) = {(6, 6), collect},
• Cpbl(collect) = {collect, (1, 1), (1, 6), (6, 1), (6, 6)}.
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States are quadruples 〈x, y, d, i〉, with x, y ∈ {1, · · · , 6} being the coordinates of the agent’s
position in the world, d ∈ {North, East, West, South} the direction it is facing, and i ∈ {0, 1},
i = 1 if an item is present in the cell with the agent, else i = 0. The agent can perform
five actions {left, right, forward, see, take}, meaning, turn left, turn right, move one cell
forward, see whether an item is present and take an item. The only observation possible when
executing one of the physical actions is obsNil, the null observation, and see has possible
observations from the set {0, 1} for whether the agent sees the presence of an item (1) or not
(0).
Next, we define the possible outcomes for each action: When the agent turns left or right,
it can get stuck in the same direction, turn 90◦ or overshoots by 90◦. When the agent moves
forward, it moves one cell in the direction it is facing or it gets stuck and does not move. The
agent can see an item or see nothing (no item in the cell), and taking is deterministic (if there
is an item present, it will be collected with certainty, if the agent executes take). All actions
except take are designed so that the correct outcome is achieved 95% of the time and incorrect
outcomes are achieved 5% of the time.
Seven experiments were performed, with different weight-combinations (αg) assigned for
each experiment. For each trial, the agent starts in a random location and performs 100 actions.
When g ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 6), (6, 1), (6, 6)}, we let σg(s) = 1 − dist/10 where 10 is the maximum
Manhattan distance between two cells in the world and dist is the Manhattan distance between
the cells represented by g and s, and we let σcollect(s) = 1−dist/10, where dist is the Manhattan
distance between the cell represented by s and the closest cell containing an item.
In the BatryPack domain, the agent’s task is to keep a pack of rechargeable batteries within
a given voltage range. There are three batteries available, each with a maximum capacity of 6
volts. For every time-unit that a battery is in the pack, it loses 1 volt. For every time-unit a
battery is out of the pack, it gains 1 volt. The pack is considered to be within range if the sum
of the batteries currently in the pack is in [3, 9]. (The possible pack-voltage-range is [0, 18]).
The goals are {maintain, charge}, meaning that the agent should, respectively, try to keep the
pack within range, and charge the batteries. The goals are, intuitively, not mutually exclusive.
States are of the form 〈(io1, v1), (io2, v2), (io3, v3)〉, with ioj being either in or out, indicating
whether battery j is in or out of the pack, and vj is the batteries current voltage. The agent can
perform ten actions: no−op and for j = 1, 2, 3, removej, addj and measurej, meaning, remove
battery j from the pack, add battery j to the pack, respectively, measure the current voltage
available in battery j. The only observation possible when executing one of the physical actions
is obsNil; measurej has possible observations from the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. When the agent
removes or adds a battery, it may fail to do so with a 5% chance. The measurement action
is deterministic, but 5% of the time it will perceive a voltage one volt more or less than it is
actually.
Six experiments were performed with different weights (W (g)) assigned for each experiment
- three while the goals were mutually incompatible and three while the goals may be pursued
simultaneously. For each trial, the initial state is 〈(in, 6), (out, 3), (out, 3)〉 with the initial
intention being maintain - and the agent/system performs 50 actions. We let σmaintain(s) equal
1 if the battery pack is within range, else it equals a value less than 1 (min. 0) in proportion
to how far the pack voltage is from being within range. We let σcharge(s) = c/3 where c is the
number of batteries which are out of the pack.
5.1 Evaluation of HPB Agent Performance
Table 1 shows the results. It can be seen quite clearly that the agent can be directed to certain
corners and to collect items with a dedication proportional to the weights chosen by the agent
designer for the respective goals.
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Table 1: Performance of the grid-world agent for various combinations of goal-weights.
Goal Weights
(1,1) 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.33 0.2
(1,6) 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.33 0.2
(6,6) 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.2
(6,1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
collect 1 0 0 0 0.5 0.34 0.2
Goal Performance
(1,1) 0.5 0 4.1 4.1 0 3.5 2.3
(1,6) 0.4 0.1 4.2 0 0.9 3.5 2.2
(6,6) 0.3 1 0 4.1 4.6 0.1 2.3
(6,1) 0.5 0 0 0 0.4 0.1 2.5
collect 11 0.2 0.3 0.4 3.5 1.6 0.6
Table 2: Performance of the BatryPack system for various combinations of goal-weights, for
mutually compatible (joint) and incompatible (disjoint) goals.
Joint
maintain
weight
0.2 0.5 0.8
charge weight 0.8 0.5 0.2
% within range 50 65.8 56.6
% one/two
intentions
19/81 18/82 58/42
Disjoint
maintain
weight
0.2 0.5 0.8
charge weight 0.8 0.5 0.2
% within range 52 53.6 48.8
% one/two
intentions
100/0 100/0 100/0
Table 2 shows the results. It can be seen that the system performs better when the goals are
pursued jointly, particularly when maintaining pack voltage and trying to charge the batteries
have equal weights. In the table, “% one/two intentions” means that for x/y, the percentage
of time that there was exactly one intention in I is x and the percentage of time that there
were exactly two intentions in I is y.
These experiments highlight four important features of the HPB architecture:
(1) Each of several goals can be pursued individually until satisfactorily achieved. (2) Goals
must periodically be re-achieved. (3) The trade-off between (weights of) goals can be set
effectively. (4) Goals can be satisfied even while dealing with stochastic actions and perceptions.
6 Related Work
AgentSpeak+ (Bauters et al., 2015) extends the BDI language AgentSpeak (Rao, 1996) with
on-demand probabilistic planning in uncertain environments. AgentSpeak has a plan library
of plans, each plan being of the form
e : b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm ← c1; · · · ; cn
where e is a triggering event, b1, . . . , bm are belief literals and c1, . . . , cn are actions or goals.
Goals may become (internal) triggering events. Events in the (external) environment may also
be perceived as triggering events. As triggering events occur, they are placed in a set and
periodically selected for processing. An event is ‘processed’ by selecting an appropriate plan
from the plan library with a matching triggering event. A plan is appropriate if its context
b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm is a logical consequence of the agent’s set of base beliefs. The goals and/or actions
c1; · · · ; cn of the selected appropriate plan will be processed in sequence. If ci is an action,
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it is executed; if it is a goal, it becomes an internal event which may trigger the selection
and execution of further plans. An AgentSpeak agent maintains a set of intentions and each
intention is a stack of plans. Please refer to (Rao, 1996) for details. When considering HPB
plans, e is roughly analogous to I, b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm is roughly analogous to Φ or B and c1; · · · ; cn
is roughly analogous to pi.
The contribution of AgentSpeak+ is to allow a POMDP planner to suggest the optimal
action at a point in a (written) plan where the agent designer feels that an optimal action is
required at that point, or that there is insufficient information at the time of writing the plan to
suggest a reasonable action. In other words, there might be points in a plan when actions are
best chosen just before execution so that they can be determined appropriately for the agent’s
current context.
Bauters et al. (2015) make use of only the first action of any POMDP policy. Online
POMDP planners do forward-search to a given depth h (number of future actions). The deeper
the look-ahead depth, the more optimal the actions in the policy. It might actually be a waste
of computational resources to discard the whole policy of depth h once it is available. An agent
could use its whole policy-tree and only generate a new policy after it has finished using the
current policy to execute h actions. However, the actions closer to the end of the policy tree will
tend to be farther from optimal than those closer to the tree’s root. In future work, we would
like to find ways to balance out the myopic take-first-action approach and the over-optimistic
take-all-actions approach.
AgentSpeak+ does not have a mechanism for storing and reusing generated policies.
An advantage of AgentSpeak+ is that their written plans can be more expressive than HPB
plans: elements of their plans are written in a language based on a fragment of first-order
logic, including n-ary predicates and variable terms. Nonetheless, even though an HPB a-plan
is propositional in nature (not relational), a policy has a reasonably expressive tree structure
with branching conditional on observations of context sentences. A desirable feature that
AgentSpeak plans have that HPB plans lack is the ability to call plans from within plans.
Some slightly less related work will now be reviewed.
Walczak et al. (2007) and Meneguzzi et al. (2007) have incorporated online plan generation
into BDI systems, however the planners deal only with deterministic actions and observations.
Nair and Tambe (2005) use POMDP theory to coordinate teams of agents. However, their
framework is very different to our architecture. They use POMDP theory to determine good
role assignments of team members, not for generating policies online.
Lim et al. (2008) provide a rather sophisticated architecture for controlling the behavior of
an emotional agent. Their agents reason with several classes of emotion and their agents are
supposed to portray emotional behavior, not simply to solve problems, but to look believable
to humans. Their architecture has a “continuous planner [...] that is capable of partial order
planning and includes emotion-focused coping [...]” Their work has a different application to
ours, however, we could take inspiration from them to improve the HPB architecture.
Pereira et al. (2008) take a different approach to use POMDPs to improve BDI agents.
By leveraging the relationship between POMDP and BDI models, as discussed by Simari and
Parsons (2006), they devised an algorithm to extract BDI plans from optimal POMDP policies.
The main difference to our work is that their policies are pre-generated and BDI-style rules are
extracted for all contingencies. The advantage is that no (time-consuming) online plan/policy
generation is necessary. The disadvantage of their approach is that all the BDI plans must be
stores and every time the domain model changes, a new POMDP must be solved and the policy-
to-BDI-plan algorithm must be run. It is not exactly clear from their paper (Pereira et al.,
2008) how or when intentions are chosen. Although it is interesting to know the relationship
between POMDPs and BDI models (Simari and Parsons, 2006, 2011), we did not use any of
these insights in developing our architecture. However, the fact that the HPB architecture does
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integrate the two frameworks, is probably due to the existence of the relationship.
Rens et al. (2009) also introduced a hybrid POMDP-BDI architecture, but without a notion
of desire levels or satisfaction levels. Although their basic approaches to combine the POMDP
and BDI frameworks is the same as ours, there are at least three major differences: Firstly,
they define their architecture in terms of the GOLOG agent language (Boutilier et al., 2000).
Secondly, their approach uses a computationally intensive method for deciding whether to
refocus; performing short policy look-aheads to ascertain the most valuable goal to pursue.1
Our approach seems much more efficient. Thirdly, in their approach, the agent cannot pursue
several goals concurrently.
Chen et al. (2013) incorporate probabilistic graphical models into the BDI framework for
plan selection in stochastic environments. An agent maintains epistemic states (with random
variables) to model the uncertainty about the stochastic environment, and corresponding belief
sets of the epistemic state are defined. The possible states of the environment, according to
sensory observations, and their relationships are modeled using probabilistic graphical models:
The uncertainty propagation is carried out by Bayesian Networks and belief sets derived from
the epistemic states trigger the selection of relevant plans from a plan library. For cases when
more than one plan is applicable due to uncertainty in an agent’s beliefs, they propose a utility-
driven approach for plan selection, where utilities of actions are modeled in influence diagrams.
Our architecture is different in that it does not have a library of pre-supplied plans; in our
architecture, policies (plans) are generated online.
None of the approaches mentioned maintain desire levels for selecting intentions. The benefit
of maintaining desire levels is that intentions are not selected only according what they offer
with respect to their current expected reward, but also according to when last they were
achieved.
7 Conclusion
Our work focuses on providing high-level decision-making capabilities for robots and agents
who live in dynamic stochastic environments, where multiple goals and goal types must be
pursued. We introduced a hybrid POMDP-BDI agent architecture, which may display emergent
behavior, driven by the intensities of their desires. In the past decade, several BDIAs have been
augmented with capabilities to deal with uncertainty. The HPB architecture is novel in that it
can pursue multiple goals concurrently. Goals must periodically be re-achieved, depending on
the goals’ desire levels, which change over time and in proportion to how close the goals are to
being satisfied.
A major benefit of the HPB architecture is that every action recommended by a generated
policy simultaneously maximizes the agent’s reward with respect to pursuit of all the current
intentions. As far as the authors are aware, no other agent architecture is capable of this.
In previous work (Rens and Meyer, 2015), we argued that maintenance goals like avoiding
moist areas (or collecting soil samples) should rather be viewed as a preference and modeled
as a POMDP reward function. And specific tasks to complete (like collecting gas or keeping
its battery charged) should be modeled as BDI desires. The idea is that while the agent
is pursuing goals, it can concurrently perform rewarding actions not directly related to its
goals. The architecture reported about in this paper does not make a clear distinction between
overt and maintenance goals. In the new version of the architecture, that distinction can be
simulated, however, now goals can be pursued in a much more fine-grained way via the choice
of goal-weights (W (g)).
1Essentially, the goals in G are stacked in descending order of the value of V ∗HPB (B, g, h
−), where h− < h
and B is the current belief state. The goal on top of the stack becomes the intention.
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Another important feature brought into the new version is the ability to mark sets of goals
as disjoint thereby forcing the agent to never pursue these goals concurrently, that is, disjoint
goals will never be in I simultaneously.
Although Nair and Tambe (2005) and Chen et al. (2013) call their approaches hybrid,
our architecture can arguably more confidently be called hybrid because of its more intimate
integration of POMDP and BDI concepts.
We could take some advice from Antos and Pfeffer (2011). They provide a systematic
methodology to incorporate emotion into a decision-theoretic framework, and also provide “a
principled, domain-independent methodology for generating heuristics in novel situations”.
Policies returned by Plan as defined in this paper are optimal. A major benefit of a POMDP-
based architecture is that the literature on POMDP planning optimization (Murphy, 2000; Roy
et al., 2005; Paquet et al., 2005; Li et al., 2005; Shani et al., 2007; Ross et al., 2008; Cai et al.,
2009; Shani et al., 2013) (for instance) can be drawn upon to improve the speed with which
policies can be generated.
Evaluating the proposed architecture in richer domains would highlight problems in the
architecture and indicate new directions for research and development in the area of hybrid
POMDP-BDI architectures.
The expressivity of the language we use for describing goals and for writing conditions in
a-plans is relatively low. AgentSpeak, for instance, has a richer language. The language’s
expressivity is mostly independent of the architecture. We thus chose to use a simple language
to better focus on the components we want to discuss.
The design of the HPB agent architecture is a medium-to-long-term programme. We would
like to keep improving its capabilities to deal with unforeseen, complex events in a changing,
noisy environment. The next step is to rigorously test the architecture using an HPB agent in a
complex simulated world. In particular, HPB agents with a plan library, including (pre-written)
a-plans and (generated) b-plans, must still be assessed. There is also scope for improving the
focussing procedure. And analyzing under what conditions the two forms of desire update rule
produce better performance must be investigated.
There may be better methods for learning than policy reuse. Policy reuse has its place
when reasoning time or power is limited, but given the time and power, more sophisticated
techniques could perhaps generate and store shorter, more effective plans. For instance, when
an agent encounters a landmark with relatively high certainty, the landmark’s location can be
stored. The agent could then augment its sensor readings with the stored location data to reach
the landmark more easily in future. Some objects in the environment might not be stable, and
their location data should ‘degrade’ over time in proportion to the environment’s dynamism.
Singh et al. (2011) provide a method for learning which (pre-written) plans in a BDI system
should be executed in which contexts (given a selection of context-applicable plans). Their
approach can also relearn context-plan matches as conditions change in dynamic environments.
Future versions of the HPB architecture could benefit from ideas in their work.
Prediction is an inherent part of POMDP planning, but we would like our agents to predict
much farther into the future, and recognize critical events which it should deal with or avoid.
POMDP policies and pre-written plans are more for local ‘tactical’ control. We need to bring
in techniques for the agent to think globally or ‘strategically’.
The set of intentions might change while executing a policy. If the current set of intentions
changes a lot, the current policy might become inapplicable. This is a typical BDI reconsider-
ation issue. However, an HPB agent will usually only perform very few actions before seeking
a new plan. Just as in the case with humans, our agent should normally not get in trouble
by assuming that things have not changed significantly in the last few steps. If the environ-
ment is so dynamic that relatively short plans can become inappropriate before completion
of the plans, then the agent should have some more low-level, reactive systems to deal with
23
the changes. In highly dynamical environments, the HPB ‘agent’ is better suited to being the
high-level reasoning module of a larger system.
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